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She Just Had a Baby. Soon She'll Start 7th Grade. | TIME

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Ashley just had a baby. She’s sitting on the couch in a relative’s apartment in Clarksdale, Miss., wearing camo-print leggings and fiddling with the plastic hospital bracelets still on her wrists. It’s August and pushing 90 degrees, which means the brown patterned curtains are drawn, the air conditioner is on high, and the room feels like a hiding place. Peanut, the baby boy she delivered two days earlier, is asleep in a car seat at her feet, dressed in a little blue outfit. Ashley is surrounded by family, but nobody is smiling. One relative silently eats lunch in the kitchen, her two siblings stare glumly at their phones, and her mother, Regina, watches from across the room. Ashley was discharged from the hospital only hours ago, but there are no baby presents or toys in the room, no visible diapers or ointments or bottles. Almost nobody knows that Peanut exists, because almost nobody knew that Ashley was pregnant. She is 13 years old. Soon she’ll start seventh grade.

In the fall of 2022, Ashley was raped by a stranger in the yard outside her home, her mother says. For weeks, she didn’t tell anybody what happened, not even her mom. But Regina knew something was wrong. Ashley used to love going outside to make dances for her TikTok, but suddenly she refused to leave her bedroom. When she turned 13 that November, she wasn't in the mood to celebrate. “She just said, ‘It hurts,’” Regina remembers. “She was crying in her room. I asked her what was wrong, and she said she didn’t want to tell me.” (To protect the privacy of a juvenile rape survivor, TIME is using pseudonyms to refer to Ashley and Regina; Peanut is the baby’s nickname.)

The signs were obvious only in retrospect. Ashley started feeling sick to her stomach; Regina thought it was related to her diet. At one point, Regina even asked Ashley if she was pregnant, and Ashley said nothing. Regina hadn’t yet explained to her daughter how a baby is made, because she didn’t think Ashley was old enough to understand. “They need to be kids,” Regina says. She doesn’t think Ashley even realized that what happened to her could lead to a pregnancy.

On Jan. 11, Ashley began throwing up so much that Regina took her to the emergency room at Northwest Regional Medical Center in Clarksdale. When her bloodwork came back, the hospital called the police. One nurse came in and asked Ashley, “What have you been doing?” Regina recalls. That’s when they found out Ashley was pregnant. “I broke down,” Regina says.

Dr. Erica Balthrop was the ob-gyn on call that day. Balthrop is an assured, muscular woman with close-cropped cornrows and a tattoo of a feather running down her arm. She ordered an ultrasound, and determined Ashley was 10 or 11 weeks along. “It was surreal for her,” Balthrop recalls. "She just had no clue.” The doctor could not get Ashley to answer any questions, or to speak at all. “She would not open her mouth.” (Balthrop spoke about her patient's medical history with Regina's permission.)

At their second visit, about a week later, Regina tentatively asked Balthrop if there was any way to terminate Ashley’s pregnancy. Seven months earlier, Balthrop could have directed Ashley to abortion clinics in Memphis, 90 minutes north, or in Jackson, Miss., two and a half hours south. But today, Ashley lives in the heart of abortion-ban America. In 2018, Republican lawmakers in Mississippi enacted a ban on most abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy. The law was blocked by a federal judge, who ruled that it violated the abortion protections guaranteed by Roe v. Wade. The Supreme Court felt differently. In their June 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Supreme Court overturned the constitutional right to abortion that had existed for nearly half a century. Within weeks, Mississippi and every state that borders it banned abortion in almost all circumstances.

Balthrop told Regina that the closest abortion provider for Ashley would be in Chicago. At first, Regina thought she and Ashley could drive there. But it’s a nine-hour trip, and Regina would have to take off work. She’d have to pay for gas, food, and a place to stay for a couple of nights, not to mention the cost of the abortion itself. “I don’t have the funds for all this,” she says.

So Ashley did what girls with no other options do: she did nothing.

Clarksdale is in the Mississippi Delta, a vast stretch of flat, fertile land in the northwest corner of the state, between the Mississippi and Yazoo rivers. The people who live in the Delta are overwhelmingly Black. The poverty rate is high. The region is an epicenter of America’s ongoing Black maternal-health crisis. Mississippi has the second-highest maternal-mortality rate in the country, with 43 deaths per 100,00 live births, and the Delta has among the worst maternal-healthcare outcomes in the state. Black women in Mississippi are four times as likely to die from pregnancy-related complications as white women.

Mississippi’s abortion ban is expected to result in thousands of additional births, often to low-income, high-risk mothers. Dr. Daniel Edney, Mississippi’s top health official, tells TIME his department is “actively preparing” for roughly 4,000 additional live births this year alone. Edney says improving maternal-health outcomes is the “No. 1 priority” for the Mississippi health department, which has invested $2 million into its Healthy Moms, Healthy Babies program to provide extra support for new mothers. “There is a sense of following through, and not just as a predominantly pro-life state,” says Edney. “We don’t just care about life in utero. We care about life, period, and that includes the mother’s life and the baby’s life.”

Mississippi’s abortion ban contains narrow exceptions, including for rape victims and to save the life of the mother. As Ashley's case shows, these exceptions are largely theoretical. Even if a victim files a police report, there appears to be no clear process for granting an exception. (The state Attorney General’s office did not return TIME’s repeated requests to clarify the process for granting exceptions; the Mississippi Board of Medical Licensure and the Mississippi State Medical Association did not reply to TIME’s requests for explanation.) And, of course, there are no abortion providers left in the state. In January, the New York Times reported that since Mississippi's abortion law went into effect, only two exceptions had been made. Even if the process for obtaining one were clear, it wouldn’t have helped Ashley. Regina didn’t know that Mississippi’s abortion ban had an exception for rape.

Even before Dobbs, it was perilous to become a mother in rural Mississippi. More than half the counties in the state can be classified as maternity-care deserts, according to a 2023 report from the March of Dimes, meaning there are no birthing facilities or obstetric providers. More than 24% of women in Mississippi have no birthing hospital within a 30-minute drive, compared to the national average of roughly 10%. According to Edney, there are just nine ob-gyns serving a region larger than the state of Delaware. Every time another ob-gyn retires, Balthrop gets an influx of new patients. “These patients are having to drive further to get the same care, then they're having to wait longer,” Balthrop says.

Read More: The Future of Abortion Access After Roe v. Wade.

Those backups can have cascading effects. Balthrop recalls one woman who had to wait four weeks to get an appointment. "That’s unacceptable, because you don't know if she’s high risk or not until she sees you," the doctor says says. Her patient "didn’t know she was pregnant. Now the time has lapsed so much that she can’t drive anyplace to terminate even if she chose to."

Early data suggests the Dobbs decision will make this problem worse. Younger doctors and medical students say they don't want to move to states with abortion restrictions. When Emory University researcher Ariana Traub surveyed almost 500 third- and fourth-year medical students in 2022, close to 80% said that abortion laws influenced where they planned to apply to residency. Nearly 60% said they were unlikely to apply to any residency programs in states with abortion restrictions. Traub had assumed that abortion would be most important to students studying obstetrics, but was surprised to find that three-quarters of students across all medical specialties said that Dobbs was affecting their residency decisions.

“People often forget that doctors are people and patients too,” Traub says. “And residency is often the time when people are in their mid-30s and thinking of starting a family.” Traub found that medical students weren’t just reluctant to practice in states with abortion bans. They didn’t want to become pregnant there, either.

And so Dobbs has compounded America's maternal-health crisis: more women are delivering more babies, in areas where there are already not enough doctors to care for them, while abortion bans are making it more difficult to recruit qualified providers to the regions that need them most. “People always ask me: ‘Why do you choose to stay there?’” says Balthrop, who has worked in the Delta for more than 20 years. “I feel like I have no choice at this point."

The weeks went on, and Ashley entered her second trimester. She wore bigger clothes to hide her bump, until she was so big that Regina took her out of school. They told everyone Ashley needed surgery for a bad ulcer. “We’ve been keeping it quiet, because people judge wrong when they don’t know what’s going on,” Regina says. She’s been trying to keep Ashley away from “nosy people.” For months, Ashley spent most of the day alone, finishing up sixth grade on her laptop. The family still has no plans to tell anybody about the pregnancy. “It’s going to be a little private matter here,” Regina says.

Ashley has ADHD and trouble focusing, and has an Individualized Education Program at school. She had never talked much, but after the rape she went from shy to almost mute. Regina thinks she may have been too traumatized to speak. At first, Regina couldn’t even get Ashley to tell her about the rape at all.

In an interview in a side bedroom, while Ashley watched TV with Peanut in another room, Regina recounted the details of her daughter’s sexual assault, as she understands them. It was a weekend in the fall, shortly after lunchtime, and Ashley, then 12, had been outside their home making TikToks while her uncle and sibling were inside. A man came down the street and into the front yard, grabbed Ashley, and covered her mouth, Regina says. He pulled her around to the side of the house and raped her. Ashley told Regina that her assailant was an adult, and that she didn’t know him. Nobody else witnessed the assault.

Shortly after finding out Ashley was pregnant, Regina filed a complaint with the Clarksdale Police Department. The department's assistant chief of police, Vincent Ramirez, confirmed to TIME that a police report had been filed in the matter, but refused to share the document because it involved a minor.

Regina says that another family member believed they had identified the rapist through social-media sleuthing. The family says they flagged the man they suspected to the police, but the investigation seemed to go nowhere. Ramirez declined to comment on an ongoing investigation, but an investigator in the department confirmed to TIME that an arrest has not yet been made. With their investigation still incomplete, police have not yet publicly confirmed that they believe Ashley’s pregnancy resulted from sexual assault.

Regina felt the police weren’t taking the case seriously. She says she was told that in order to move the investigation forward, the police needed DNA from the baby after its birth. Experts say this is not unusual. Although it is technically possible to obtain DNA from a fetus, police are often reluctant to initiate an invasive procedure on a pregnant victim, says Phillip Danielson, a professor of forensic genetics at the University of Denver. They typically test DNA only on fetal remains after an abortion, or after a baby is born, he says.

But almost three days after Peanut was born, the police still hadn’t picked up the DNA sample; it was only after inquiries from TIME that officers finally arrived to collect it. Asked at the Clarksdale police station why it had taken so long after Peanut's birth for crucial evidence to be collected, Ramirez shrugged. “It’s a pretty high priority, as a juvenile,” he says. “Sometimes they slip a little bit because we’ve got a lot going on, but then they come back to it.”

Ashley doesn’t say much when asked how it felt to learn she was pregnant. Her mouth twists into a shy grimace, and she looks away. “Not good,” she says after a long pause. “Not happy.”

Regina’s own feelings about abortion became more complicated as the pregnancy progressed. She got pregnant with her first daughter at 17, and was a mother at 18. “I was a teen,” says Regina, now 33. “But I wasn’t as young as her.”

Regina had considered abortion during one of her own pregnancies. But her grandmother admonished her, “Your mama didn’t abort you.” Now Regina felt caught between her family’s general disapproval of abortion and the realization that her 13-year-old daughter was pregnant as the result of a rape. “I wish she had just told me when it happened. We could have gotten Plan B or something,” Regina says, referring to the emergency contraceptive often known as the “morning-after pill.” “That would have been that.”

Balthrop often sees this kind of ambivalence. Clarksdale is in the heart of the Bible Belt, and many of her patients are Black women from religious families. Even if they want to terminate their pregnancies, Balthrop says, many of them ultimately decide not to go through with it. Since the Dobbs decision, however, Balthrop has seen an increase in “incomplete abortions,” which is when the pregnancy has been terminated but the uterus hasn’t been fully emptied. Medication abortions— abortions managed with pills, which are increasingly available online—are overwhelmingly safe, but occasionally can have minor complications when the pills are not taken exactly as directed. “They're having complications after—not serious, but they'll come in with significant bleeding, and then we still have to finish the process,” Balthrop says, explaining that they sometimes have to evacuate dead fetal tissue.

According to Balthrop, Ashley didn’t have complications during her pregnancy. But she didn’t start speaking more until she felt the baby move, around her sixth month. “That’s when it hit home,” Balthrop says. “She’d complain about little aches and pains that she had never had before. That’s when her mom would come in and say, ‘She asked me this question,’ and the three of us would sit and talk about it.”

How did Ashley feel in anticipation of becoming a mother? “Nervous,” is all she will say. Toward the end of the pregnancy, she was terrified of going into labor, Balthrop recalls. Most of her questions were about pushing, and delivery, and how painful it would be. She was focused on “the delivery process itself,” Balthrop says. “Not, ‘What am I going to do when I take this baby home?’”

The Clarksdale Woman’s Clinic, where Balthrop practices, is across the street from the emergency room at Northwest Regional Medical Center, where Ashley first learned she was pregnant. The clinic is large and welcoming, with comfortable chairs and paintings of flowers on the walls. The staff is kind and efficient, the space is clean, and it helps that the three ob-gyns on staff are Black, since most of the patients are Black women. The clinic’s strong reputation attracts patients from an hour away in all directions. It is a lifeline in a vast region with few other maternity health options.

Even for healthy patients, it can be dangerous to be pregnant in such a rural area. “We have patients who walk to our clinic. They don't have transportation,” says Casey Shoun, an administrative assistant at Clarksdale Woman’s. Some can get Medicaid transportation, but it’s notoriously unreliable. The trip can be hard even for local residents: the roads leading to the clinic don’t have good sidewalks, and temperatures in the Delta regularly reach 100 degrees in the summer.

Shoun says the clinic gets patients who are six months pregnant by the time they have their first prenatal appointment. “We've had patients who go to the hospital, and they've already delivered,” Shoun says. Balthrop recalls one woman who went into labor about seven weeks early, and had to drive 45 minutes to get to the hospital. She was too late. “By the time she got here, the baby had passed already,” Balthrop says.

Clarksdale Woman's is equipped to handle routine appointments for a healthy pregnancy like Ashley’s. But a pregnant woman with any complication at all—from deep-vein thrombosis to diabetes, preeclampsia to advanced maternal age—will have to make a three-hour round trip drive to Memphis to see the closest maternal-fetal-medicine specialist. The most vulnerable patients are often the ones who have to travel the farthest for pregnancy care.

Read More: Inside Mississippi's Last Abortion Clinic.

One morning in August, as the clinic filled, Balthrop allowed TIME to interview consenting patients in the waiting room and parking lot. One of them was Mikashia Hardiman, who is 18 years old and pregnant with her first child. Hardiman had just had her 20-week anatomy scan, and learned that she has a shortened cervix, which means her mother now has to drive her to Memphis to see a specialist.

Jessica Ray, 36, was 13 weeks pregnant with her third child. Three years ago, when she suddenly went into labor with her second child at 33 weeks, she drove herself 45 minutes to the hospital and delivered less than half an hour after she arrived. Ray knows the travel ordeals ahead of her: because she had preeclampsia with her first two pregnancies, she’ll have to go see the specialist in Memphis each month. “You have to take off work and make sure somebody's getting your kids,” Ray says.

Balthrop, who has three kids of her own, has long considered moving to a different region with a better education system. "I feel like I can’t," she says. "I would be letting so many people down."

But the clinic is under serious financial strain. Between overhead, malpractice insurance, the increasing costs of goods and services, and decreasing insurance reimbursements, Balthrop and her colleagues can barely afford to keep Clarksdale Woman's open. They’re considering selling the practice to a hospital 30 miles away. If that happened, Balthrop says, babies would no longer be delivered in Clarksdale, a city of less than 15,000. Some of her patients would have to leave the Delta—possibly driving an hour or more—to get even the most basic maternity care.

For the patients who already struggle to make it to Clarksdale, that would spell disaster. "They just wouldn't get care until they show up for delivery at the hospital,” says Shoun, the administrative assistant. “Imagine if we weren't here. Where would they go?"

Ashley started feeling contractions on a Saturday afternoon when she was 39 weeks pregnant. She called Regina, who came home from work, and together they started timing them. They arrived at the hospital around 8 p.m. that night. An exam revealed Ashley was already six centimeters dilated. Her water broke soon after, and she got an epidural. She delivered Peanut within five hours. Ashley describes the birth in one word: “Painful.”

For Regina, the arrival of her first grandchild has not eased the pain of watching what her daughter has endured. “This situation hurts the most because it was an innocent child doing what children do, playing outside, and it was my child,” Regina says. “It still hurts, and is going to always hurt.”

Ashley doesn’t know anybody else who has a baby. She doesn’t want her three friends at school to find out that she has one now. Regina is working on an arrangement with the school so Ashley can start seventh grade from home until she’s ready to go back in person. Relatives will watch Peanut while Regina is at work. Is there anything about motherhood that Ashley is excited about? She twists her mouth, shrugs, and says nothing. Is there anything Ashley wants to say to other girls? “Be careful when you go outside,” she says. “And stay safe.”

There is only one moment when Ashley smiles a little, and it’s when she describes the nurses she met in the doctors’ office and delivery room. One of them, she remembers, was “nice” and “cool.” She has decided that when she grows up, she wants to be a nurse too. “To help people,” she says. For a second, she looks like any other soon-to-be seventh grader sharing her childhood dream. Then Peanut stirs in his car seat. Regina says he needs to be fed. Ashley’s face goes blank again. She is a mother now.

With reporting by Leslie Dickstein

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The Petty Feud Between the NYT and the White House - POLITICO

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Even if some of the hard feelings toward the Times have eased somewhat with time — several White House reporters, after verbally reiterating their willingness to abide by the administration’s embargo rules, were added back to the “tier one” list earlier this year — officials in the Biden press shop remain frustrated that the coverage hasn’t changed. The paper continues to serve up fodder for the “NYT Pitchbot’’ account on X, which has amassed a large following (including almost the entire Biden press shop) by mocking the paper’s perceived negativity toward the president and its often euphemistic-laden, soft focus coverage of Trump.

Bates, the deputy press secretary, has developed an online correspondence with the operator of the Pitchbot account and occasionally shared material for potential posts, two people familiar with the press shop said. During last year’s White House Correspondents Dinner, Biden joked about confusing the Times’ coverage of his age with Pitchbot’s tweets. “I love that guy,” Biden said of Pitchbot, before a subtle parting shot at the Times on a frequency only Times staffers might hear. “I should do an interview with him.”

Aides in the White House press office and on the president’s campaign pointed to two recent examples of articles by the Times that presented Biden and Trump side by side, emphasizing broad similarities and obscuring the proportional differences. One piece by Michael Shear cast both Biden and Trump as restricting the information the public has about their physical health. Another in the paper’s On Politics newsletter by the newly hired Jess Bidgood reacted to Arizona’s reinstatement of a Civil War era law outlawing abortion by framing Biden and Trump as two “imperfect messengers” on the issue, a gross journalistic injustice, campaign officials said, given Trump’s outsized role in appointing the Supreme Court justices who overturned Roe v. Wade.

TJ Ducklo, a senior adviser on Biden’s campaign, blasted Shear’s story as part of an ongoing pattern of frustrating coverage by the Times. “With limited exceptions,” he wrote in a post on X, the Times “continues to fail the American people in covering the most important election for democracy in 150+ years.” It was not the first time Biden’s campaign team publicly went after the Times in a way the White House, for all its irritation, has not. In February, the campaign blasted the Times and other news organizations for focusing more on the president’s age than Trump’s comment encouraging Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to any NATO country not meeting defense spending benchmarks. “If you read the New York Times this weekend, you might have missed it buried behind five separate opinion pieces about how the president is 81 year old — something that has been true since his birthday in November — and *zero* on this topic,” Ducklo wrote.

Earlier this year, Ducklo, communications director Michael Tyler and other senior campaign aides met privately in Wilmington with groups of reporters from a number of organizations covering Biden (including POLITICO), almost all of whom got dressed down for coverage that was seen as too fixated on the president’s age or other liabilities, especially compared to the treatment of Trump. But when Semafor wrote about the off-the-record meetings, only the meeting with the Times was described as not having been “substantive” or “productive.”

Times reporters believe the leak had to have come from the campaign, the only ones who’d have had knowledge of all the meetings. And it led to conversations on the politics staff about whether to even engage with Wilmington in an off-the-record capacity. But campaign aides are certain the leak came from the Times side. “We had done over a dozen of these meetings leading up to the Times meeting and only got a press inquiry about the meetings less than 48 hours after the Times meeting,” senior campaign officials told me, noting that Semafor’s Max Tani “quoted back to us the exact language that had been used by Times reporters in the meeting two days earlier.”

The campaign’s outward turn toward press criticism is something of a new phenomenon, mirroring the response of the very online left in the age of Trump. But the Times is bearing the brunt of it. And many who’ve given their careers to the institution are perplexed by the shift.

“[Criticizing] our stories in their press releases,” Bumiller said, “I just don’t know what it gets them.”

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acdha
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So petty it’s instantly believable: “It’s A.G. [Sulzberger] He’s the one who is pissed [that] Biden hasn’t done any interviews and quietly encourages all the tough reporting on his age.”
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A New York Times reporter anonymously linked the paper's publisher to its coverage of Biden's age. The volume of coverage is eye-opening. | Media Matters for America

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Emergency Slide That Fell From Delta Flight Is Recovered From Queens Jetty - The New York Times

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acdha
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“One of Mr. O’Shea’s neighbors, Jake Bissell-Linsk, who also saw the slide, is a lawyer at a law firm that filed a securities class-action suit against Boeing earlier this year.”
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Donald Trump on What His Second Term Would Look Like | TIME

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Donald Trump thinks he’s identified a crucial mistake of his first term: He was too nice.

We’ve been talking for more than an hour on April 12 at his fever-dream palace in Palm Beach. Aides lurk around the perimeter of a gilded dining room overlooking the manicured lawn. When one nudges me to wrap up the interview, I bring up the many former Cabinet officials who refuse to endorse Trump this time. Some have publicly warned that he poses a danger to the Republic. Why should voters trust you, I ask, when some of the people who observed you most closely do not?

As always, Trump punches back, denigrating his former top advisers. But beneath the typical torrent of invective, there is a larger lesson he has taken away. “I let them quit because I have a heart. I don’t want to embarrass anybody,” Trump says. “I don’t think I’ll do that again. From now on, I’ll fire.” 

Six months from the 2024 presidential election, Trump is better positioned to win the White House than at any point in either of his previous campaigns. He leads Joe Biden by slim margins in most polls, including in several of the seven swing states likely to determine the outcome. But I had not come to ask about the election, the disgrace that followed the last one, or how he has become the first former—and perhaps future—American President to face a criminal trial. I wanted to know what Trump would do if he wins a second term, to hear his vision for the nation, in his own words.

What emerged in two interviews with Trump, and conversations with more than a dozen of his closest advisers and confidants, were the outlines of an imperial presidency that would reshape America and its role in the world. To carry out a deportation operation designed to remove more than 11 million people from the country, Trump told me, he would be willing to build migrant detention camps and deploy the U.S. military, both at the border and inland. He would let red states monitor women’s pregnancies and prosecute those who violate abortion bans. He would, at his personal discretion, withhold funds appropriated by Congress, according to top advisers. He would be willing to fire a U.S. Attorney who doesn’t carry out his order to prosecute someone, breaking with a tradition of independent law enforcement that dates from America’s founding. He is weighing pardons for every one of his supporters accused of attacking the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, more than 800 of whom have pleaded guilty or been convicted by a jury. He might not come to the aid of an attacked ally in Europe or Asia if he felt that country wasn’t paying enough for its own defense. He would gut the U.S. civil service, deploy the National Guard to American cities as he sees fit, close the White House pandemic-preparedness office, and staff his Administration with acolytes who back his false assertion that the 2020 election was stolen.

Trump remains the same guy, with the same goals and grievances. But in person, if anything, he appears more assertive and confident. “When I first got to Washington, I knew very few people,” he says. “I had to rely on people.” Now he is in charge. The arranged marriage with the timorous Republican Party stalwarts is over; the old guard is vanquished, and the people who remain are his people. Trump would enter a second term backed by a slew of policy shops staffed by loyalists who have drawn up detailed plans in service of his agenda, which would concentrate the powers of the state in the hands of a man whose appetite for power appears all but insatiable. “I don’t think it’s a big mystery what his agenda would be,” says his close adviser Kellyanne Conway. “But I think people will be surprised at the alacrity with which he will take action.”

Read More: Read the Full Transcripts of Donald Trump's Interviews With TIME

The courts, the Constitution, and a Congress of unknown composition would all have a say in whether Trump’s objectives come to pass. The machinery of Washington has a range of defenses: leaks to a free press, whistle-blower protections, the oversight of inspectors general. The same deficiencies of temperament and judgment that hindered him in the past remain present. If he wins, Trump would be a lame duck—contrary to the suggestions of some supporters, he tells TIME he would not seek to overturn or ignore the Constitution’s prohibition on a third term. Public opinion would also be a powerful check. Amid a popular outcry, Trump was forced to scale back some of his most draconian first-term initiatives, including the policy of separating migrant families. As George Orwell wrote in 1945, the ability of governments to carry out their designs “depends on the general temper in the country.”

Every election is billed as a national turning point. This time that rings true. To supporters, the prospect of Trump 2.0, unconstrained and backed by a disciplined movement of true believers, offers revolutionary promise. To much of the rest of the nation and the world, it represents an alarming risk. A second Trump term could bring “the end of our democracy,” says presidential historian Douglas Brinkley, “and the birth of a new kind of authoritarian presidential order.”

Trump steps onto the patio at Mar-a-Lago near dusk. The well-heeled crowd eating Wagyu steaks and grilled branzino pauses to applaud as he takes his seat. On this gorgeous evening, the club is a MAGA mecca. Billionaire donor Steve Wynn is here. So is Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, who is dining with the former President after a joint press conference proposing legislation to prevent noncitizens from voting. Their voting in federal elections is already illegal, and extremely rare, but remains a Trumpian fixation that the embattled Speaker appeared happy to co-sign in exchange for the political cover that standing with Trump provides.

At the moment, though, Trump’s attention is elsewhere. With an index finger, he swipes through an iPad on the table to curate the restaurant’s soundtrack. The playlist veers from Sinead O’Connor to James Brown to The Phantom of the Opera. And there’s a uniquely Trump choice: a rendition of “The Star-Spangled Banner” sung by a choir of defendants imprisoned for attacking the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, interspersed with a recording of Trump reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. This has become a staple of his rallies, converting the ultimate symbol of national unity into a weapon of factional devotion. 

The spectacle picks up where his first term left off. The events of Jan. 6, during which a pro-Trump mob attacked the center of American democracy in an effort to subvert the peaceful transfer of power, was a profound stain on his legacy. Trump has sought to recast an insurrectionist riot as an act of patriotism. “I call them the J-6 patriots,” he says. When I ask whether he would consider pardoning every one of them, he says, “Yes, absolutely.” As Trump faces dozens of felony charges, including for election interference, conspiracy to defraud the United States, willful retention of national-security secrets, and falsifying business records to conceal hush-money payments, he has tried to turn legal peril into a badge of honor.

In a second term, Trump’s influence on American democracy would extend far beyond pardoning powers. Allies are laying the groundwork to restructure the presidency in line with a doctrine called the unitary executive theory, which holds that many of the constraints imposed on the White House by legislators and the courts should be swept away in favor of a more powerful Commander in Chief.

Read More: Fact-Checking What Donald Trump Said In His Interviews With TIME

Nowhere would that power be more momentous than at the Department of Justice. Since the nation’s earliest days, Presidents have generally kept a respectful distance from Senate-confirmed law-enforcement officials to avoid exploiting for personal ends their enormous ability to curtail Americans’ freedoms. But Trump, burned in his first term by multiple investigations directed by his own appointees, is ever more vocal about imposing his will directly on the department and its far-flung investigators and prosecutors.

In our Mar-a-Lago interview, Trump says he might fire U.S. Attorneys who refuse his orders to prosecute someone: “It would depend on the situation.” He’s told supporters he would seek retribution against his enemies in a second term. Would that include Fani Willis, the Atlanta-area district attorney who charged him with election interference, or Alvin Bragg, the Manhattan DA in the Stormy Daniels case, who Trump has previously said should be prosecuted? Trump demurs but offers no promises. “No, I don’t want to do that,” he says, before adding, “We’re gonna look at a lot of things. What they’ve done is a terrible thing.”

Trump has also vowed to appoint a “real special prosecutor” to go after Biden. “I wouldn’t want to hurt Biden,” he tells me. “I have too much respect for the office.” Seconds later, though, he suggests Biden’s fate may be tied to an upcoming Supreme Court ruling on whether Presidents can face criminal prosecution for acts committed in office. “If they said that a President doesn’t get immunity,” says Trump, “then Biden, I am sure, will be prosecuted for all of his crimes.” (Biden has not been charged with any, and a House Republican effort to impeach him has failed to unearth evidence of any crimes or misdemeanors, high or low.)

Read More: Trump Says ‘Anti-White Feeling’ Is a Problem in the U.S.

Such moves would be potentially catastrophic for the credibility of American law enforcement, scholars and former Justice Department leaders from both parties say. “If he ordered an improper prosecution, I would expect any respectable U.S. Attorney to say no,” says Michael McConnell, a former U.S. appellate judge appointed by President George W. Bush. “If the President fired the U.S. Attorney, it would be an enormous firestorm.” McConnell, now a Stanford law professor, says the dismissal could have a cascading effect similar to the Saturday Night Massacre, when President Richard Nixon ordered top DOJ officials to remove the special counsel investigating Watergate. Presidents have the constitutional right to fire U.S. Attorneys, and typically replace their predecessors’ appointees upon taking office. But discharging one specifically for refusing a President’s order would be all but unprecedented.

Trump’s radical designs for presidential power would be felt throughout the country. A main focus is the southern border. Trump says he plans to sign orders to reinstall many of the same policies from his first term, such as the Remain in Mexico program, which requires that non-Mexican asylum seekers be sent south of the border until their court dates, and Title 42, which allows border officials to expel migrants without letting them apply for asylum. Advisers say he plans to cite record border crossings and fentanyl- and child-trafficking as justification for reimposing the emergency measures. He would direct federal funding to resume construction of the border wall, likely by allocating money from the military budget without congressional approval. The capstone of this program, advisers say, would be a massive deportation operation that would target millions of people. Trump made similar pledges in his first term, but says he plans to be more aggressive in a second. “People need to be deported,” says Tom Homan, a top Trump adviser and former acting head of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “No one should be off the table.”

Read More: The Story Behind TIME's 'If He Wins' Trump Cover

For an operation of that scale, Trump says he would rely mostly on the National Guard to round up and remove undocumented migrants throughout the country. “If they weren’t able to, then I’d use [other parts of] the military,” he says. When I ask if that means he would override the Posse Comitatus Act—an 1878 law that prohibits the use of military force on civilians—Trump seems unmoved by the weight of the statute. “Well, these aren’t civilians,” he says. “These are people that aren’t legally in our country.” He would also seek help from local police and says he would deny funding for jurisdictions that decline to adopt his policies. “There’s a possibility that some won’t want to participate,” Trump says, “and they won’t partake in the riches.”

As President, Trump nominated three Supreme Court Justices who voted to overturn Roe v. Wade, and he claims credit for his role in ending a constitutional right to an abortion. At the same time, he has sought to defuse a potent campaign issue for the Democrats by saying he wouldn’t sign a federal ban. In our interview at Mar-a-Lago, he declines to commit to vetoing any additional federal restrictions if they came to his desk. More than 20 states now have full or partial abortion bans, and Trump says those policies should be left to the states to do what they want, including monitoring women’s pregnancies. “I think they might do that,” he says. When I ask whether he would be comfortable with states prosecuting women for having abortions beyond the point the laws permit, he says, “It’s irrelevant whether I’m comfortable or not. It’s totally irrelevant, because the states are going to make those decisions.” President Biden has said he would fight state anti-abortion measures in court and with regulation.

Trump’s allies don’t plan to be passive on abortion if he returns to power. The Heritage Foundation has called for enforcement of a 19th century statute that would outlaw the mailing of abortion pills. The Republican Study Committee (RSC), which includes more than 80% of the House GOP conference, included in its 2025 budget proposal the Life at Conception Act, which says the right to life extends to “the moment of fertilization.” I ask Trump if he would veto that bill if it came to his desk. “I don’t have to do anything about vetoes,” Trump says, “because we now have it back in the states.”

Presidents typically have a narrow window to pass major legislation. Trump’s team is eyeing two bills to kick off a second term: a border-security and immigration package, and an extension of his 2017 tax cuts. Many of the latter’s provisions expire early in 2025: the tax cuts on individual income brackets, 100% business expensing, the doubling of the estate-tax deduction. Trump is planning to intensify his protectionist agenda, telling me he’s considering a tariff of more than 10% on all imports, and perhaps even a 100% tariff on some Chinese goods. Trump says the tariffs will liberate the U.S. economy from being at the mercy of foreign manufacturing and spur an industrial renaissance in the U.S. When I point out that independent analysts estimate Trump’s first term tariffs on thousands of products, including steel and aluminum, solar panels, and washing machines, may have cost the U.S. $316 billion and more than 300,000 jobs, by one account, he dismisses these experts out of hand. His advisers argue that the average yearly inflation rate in his first term—under 2%—is evidence that his tariffs won’t raise prices.

Since leaving office, Trump has tried to engineer a caucus of the compliant, clearing primary fields in Senate and House races. His hope is that GOP majorities replete with MAGA diehards could rubber-stamp his legislative agenda and nominees. Representative Jim Banks of Indiana, a former RSC chairman and the GOP nominee for the state’s open Senate seat, recalls an August 2022 RSC planning meeting with Trump at his residence in Bedminster, N.J. As the group arrived, Banks recalls, news broke that Mar-a-Lago had been raided by the FBI. Banks was sure the meeting would be canceled. Moments later, Trump walked through the doors, defiant and pledging to run again. “I need allies there when I’m elected,” Banks recalls Trump saying. The difference in a second Trump term, Banks says now, “is he’s going to have the backup in Congress that he didn’t have before.”

Trump’s intention to remake America’s relations abroad may be just as consequential. Since its founding, the U.S. has sought to build and sustain alliances based on the shared values of political and economic freedom. Trump takes a much more transactional approach to international relations than his predecessors, expressing disdain for what he views as free-riding friends and appreciation for authoritarian leaders like President Xi Jinping of China, Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary, or former President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil.

That’s one reason America’s traditional allies were horrified when Trump recently said at a campaign rally that Russia could “do whatever the hell they want” to a NATO country he believes doesn’t spend enough on collective defense. That wasn’t idle bluster, Trump tells me. “If you’re not going to pay, then you’re on your own,” he says. Trump has long said the alliance is ripping the U.S. off. Former NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg credited Trump’s first-term threat to pull out of the alliance with spurring other members to add more than $100 billion to their defense budgets.

But an insecure NATO is as likely to accrue to Russia’s benefit as it is to America’s. President Vladimir Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine looks to many in Europe and the U.S. like a test of his broader vision to reconstruct the Soviet empire. Under Biden and a bipartisan Congress, the U.S. has sent more than $100 billion to Ukraine to defend itself. It’s unlikely Trump would extend the same support to Kyiv. After Orban visited Mar-a-Lago in March, he said Trump “wouldn’t give a penny” to Ukraine. “I wouldn’t give unless Europe starts equalizing,” Trump hedges in our interview. “If Europe is not going to pay, why should we pay? They’re much more greatly affected. We have an ocean in between us. They don’t.” (E.U. nations have given more than $100 billion in aid to Ukraine as well.)

Read More: Read the Full Transcripts of Donald Trump's Interviews With TIME

Trump has historically been reluctant to criticize or confront Putin. He sided with the Russian autocrat over his own intelligence community when it asserted that Russia interfered in the 2016 election. Even now, Trump uses Putin as a foil for his own political purposes. When I asked Trump why he has not called for the release of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, who has been unjustly held on spurious charges in a Moscow prison for a year, Trump says, “I guess because I have so many other things I’m working on.” Gershkovich should be freed, he adds, but he doubts it will happen before the election. “The reporter should be released and he will be released,” Trump tells me. “I don’t know if he’s going to be released under Biden. I would get him released.”

America’s Asian allies, like its European ones, may be on their own under Trump. Taiwan’s Foreign Minister recently said aid to Ukraine was critical in deterring Xi from invading the island. Communist China’s leaders “have to understand that things like that can’t come easy,” Trump says, but he declines to say whether he would come to Taiwan’s defense. 

Trump is less cryptic on current U.S. troop deployments in Asia. If South Korea doesn’t pay more to support U.S. troops there to deter Kim Jong Un’s increasingly belligerent regime to the north, Trump suggests the U.S. could withdraw its forces. “We have 40,000 troops that are in a precarious position,” he tells TIME. (The number is actually 28,500.) “Which doesn’t make any sense. Why would we defend somebody? And we’re talking about a very wealthy country.”

Transactional isolationism may be the main strain of Trump’s foreign policy, but there are limits. Trump says he would join Israel’s side in a confrontation with Iran. “If they attack Israel, yes, we would be there,” he tells me. He says he has come around to the now widespread belief in Israel that a Palestinian state existing side by side in peace is increasingly unlikely. “There was a time when I thought two-state could work,” he says. “Now I think two-state is going to be very, very tough.”

Yet even his support for Israel is not absolute. He’s criticized Israel’s handling of its war against Hamas, which has killed more than 30,000 Palestinians in Gaza, and has called for the nation to “get it over with.” When I ask whether he would consider withholding U.S. military aid to Israel to push it toward winding down the war, he doesn’t say yes, but he doesn’t rule it out, either. He is sharply critical of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, once a close ally. “I had a bad experience with Bibi,” Trump says. In his telling, a January 2020 U.S. operation to assassinate a top Iranian general was supposed to be a joint attack until Netanyahu backed out at the last moment. “That was something I never forgot,” he says. He blames Netanyahu for failing to prevent the Oct. 7 attack, when Hamas militants infiltrated southern Israel and killed nearly 1,200 people amid acts of brutality including burning entire families alive and raping women and girls. “It happened on his watch,” Trump says.

On the second day of Trump’s New York trial on April 17, I stand behind the packed counter of the Sanaa Convenience Store on 139th Street and Broadway, waiting for Trump to drop in for a postcourt campaign stop. He chose the bodega for its history. In 2022, one of the store’s clerks fatally stabbed a customer who attacked him. Bragg, the Manhattan DA, charged the clerk with second-degree murder. (The charges were later dropped amid public outrage over video footage that appeared to show the clerk acting in self-defense.) A baseball bat behind the counter alludes to lingering security concerns. When Trump arrives, he asks the store’s co-owner, Maad Ahmed, a Yemeni immigrant, about safety. “You should be allowed to have a gun,” Trump tells Ahmed. “If you had a gun, you’d never get robbed.”

On the campaign trail, Trump uses crime as a cudgel, painting urban America as a savage hell-scape even though violent crime has declined in recent years, with homicides sinking 6% in 2022 and 13% in 2023, according to the FBI. When I point this out, Trump tells me he thinks the data, which is collected by state and local police departments, is rigged. “It’s a lie,” he says. He has pledged to send the National Guard into cities struggling with crime in a second term—possibly without the request of governors—and plans to approve Justice Department grants only to cities that adopt his preferred policing methods like stop-and-frisk.

To critics, Trump’s preoccupation with crime is a racial dog whistle. In polls, large numbers of his supporters have expressed the view that antiwhite racism now represents a greater problem in the U.S. than the systemic racism that has long afflicted Black Americans. When I ask if he agrees, Trump does not dispute this position. “There is a definite antiwhite feeling in the country,” he tells TIME, “and that can’t be allowed either.” In a second term, advisers say, a Trump Administration would rescind Biden’s Executive Orders designed to boost diversity and racial equity.

Trump’s ability to campaign for the White House in the midst of an unprecedented criminal trial is the product of a more professional campaign operation that has avoided the infighting that plagued past versions. “He has a very disciplined team around him,” says Representative Elise Stefanik of New York. “That is an indicator of how disciplined and focused a second term will be.” That control now extends to the party writ large. In 2016, the GOP establishment, having failed to derail Trump’s campaign, surrounded him with staff who sought to temper him. Today the party’s permanent class have either devoted themselves to the gospel of MAGA or given up. Trump has cleaned house at the Republican National Committee, installing handpicked leaders—including his daughter-in-law—who have reportedly imposed loyalty tests on prospective job applicants, asking whether they believe the false assertion that the 2020 election was stolen. (The RNC has denied there is a litmus test.) Trump tells me he would have trouble hiring anyone who admits Biden won: “I wouldn’t feel good about it.”

Policy groups are creating a government-in-waiting full of true believers. The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 has drawn up plans for legislation and Executive Orders as it trains prospective personnel for a second Trump term. The Center for Renewing America, led by Russell Vought, Trump’s former director of the Office of Management and Budget, is dedicated to disempowering the so-called administrative state, the collection of bureaucrats with the power to control everything from drug-safety determinations to the contents of school lunches. The America First Policy Institute is a research haven of pro-Trump right-wing populists. America First Legal, led by Trump’s immigration adviser Stephen Miller, is mounting court battles against the Biden Administration. 

The goal of these groups is to put Trump’s vision into action on day one. “The President never had a policy process that was designed to give him what he actually wanted and campaigned on,” says Vought. “[We are] sorting through the legal authorities, the mechanics, and providing the momentum for a future Administration.” That includes a litany of boundary-pushing right-wing policies, including slashing Department of Justice funding and cutting climate and environmental regulations.

Read More: Fact-Checking What Donald Trump Said in His 2024 Interviews With TIME

Trump’s campaign says he would be the final decision-maker on which policies suggested by these organizations would get implemented. But at the least, these advisers could form the front lines of a planned march against what Trump dubs the Deep State, marrying bureaucratic savvy to their leader’s anti-bureaucratic zeal. One weapon in Trump’s second-term “War on Washington” is a wonky one: restoring the power of impoundment, which allowed Presidents to withhold congressionally appropriated funds. Impoundment was a favorite maneuver of Nixon, who used his authority to freeze funding for subsidized housing and the Environmental Protection Agency. Trump and his allies plan to challenge a 1974 law that prohibits use of the measure, according to campaign policy advisers.

Another inside move is the enforcement of Schedule F, which allows the President to fire nonpolitical government officials and which Trump says he would embrace. “You have some people that are protected that shouldn’t be protected,” he says. A senior U.S. judge offers an example of how consequential such a move could be. Suppose there’s another pandemic, and President Trump wants to push the use of an untested drug, much as he did with hydroxychloroquine during COVID-19. Under Schedule F, if the drug’s medical reviewer at the Food and Drug Administration refuses to sign off on its use, Trump could fire them, and anyone else who doesn’t approve it. The Trump team says the President needs the power to hold bureaucrats accountable to voters. “The mere mention of Schedule F,” says Vought, “ensures that the bureaucracy moves in your direction.”

It can be hard at times to discern Trump’s true intentions. In his interviews with TIME, he often sidestepped questions or answered them in contradictory ways. There’s no telling how his ego and self-destructive behavior might hinder his objectives. And for all his norm-breaking, there are lines he says he won’t cross. When asked if he would comply with all orders upheld by the Supreme Court, Trump says he would. 

But his policy preoccupations are clear and consistent. If Trump is able to carry out a fraction of his goals, the impact could prove as transformative as any presidency in more than a century. “He’s in full war mode,” says his former adviser and occasional confidant Stephen Bannon. Trump’s sense of the state of the country is “quite apocalyptic,” Bannon says. “That’s where Trump’s heart is. That’s where his obsession is.”

These obsessions could once again push the nation to the brink of crisis. Trump does not dismiss the possibility of political violence around the election. “If we don’t win, you know, it depends,” he tells TIME. “It always depends on the fairness of the election.” When I ask what he meant when he baselessly claimed on Truth Social that a stolen election “allows for the termination of all rules, regulations and articles, even those found in the Constitution,” Trump responded by denying he had said it. He then complained about the “Biden-inspired” court case he faces in New York and suggested that the “fascists” in America’s government were its greatest threat. “I think the enemy from within, in many cases, is much more dangerous for our country than the outside enemies of China, Russia, and various others,” he tells me.

Toward the end of our conversation at Mar-a-Lago, I ask Trump to explain another troubling comment he made: that he wants to be dictator for a day. It came during a Fox News town hall with Sean Hannity, who gave Trump an opportunity to allay concerns that he would abuse power in office or seek retribution against political opponents. Trump said he would not be a dictator—“except for day one,” he added. “I want to close the border, and I want to drill, drill, drill.”

Trump says that the remark “was said in fun, in jest, sarcastically.” He compares it to an infamous moment from the 2016 campaign, when he encouraged the Russians to hack and leak Hillary Clinton’s emails. In Trump’s mind, the media sensationalized those remarks too. But the Russians weren’t joking: among many other efforts to influence the core exercise of American democracy that year, they hacked the Democratic National Committee’s servers and disseminated its emails through WikiLeaks.

Whether or not he was kidding about bringing a tyrannical end to our 248-year experiment in democracy, I ask him, Don’t you see why many Americans see such talk of dictatorship as contrary to our most cherished principles? Trump says no. Quite the opposite, he insists. “I think a lot of people like it.” —With reporting by Leslie Dickstein, Simmone Shah, and Julia Zorthian

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The choice of a fascist or an American has never been clearer
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Algorithmically generated memories: automated remembrance through appropriated perception | Memory, Mind

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Through my phone, Google Photos notifies me that 2 years ago on this day I encountered a black and white cat on the streets of Paris. I also saw a tree hugging the pole of a fence. During my morning coffee, Facebook notifies me with a picture taken 6 years ago of me and a friend I later lost contact with jumping on a trampoline. As I am waiting for the bus, my phone buzzes to remind me that 14 years ago I finished high school in what seems like a former life.

The relatively new memory-functions appearing on social media platforms are one of the many ways in which digital media resurrects ‘the faded and decaying past of old school friends, former lovers, and all that could and should have been forgotten’ (Hoskins Reference Hoskins and Hoskins2017, 1). In this article, I attempt to make sense of the specific form of resurrection of the past these memory-functions mediate. I borrow JeongHyun Lee's (Reference Lee2020) terminology and refer to them as ‘algorithmically generated memories’: data on past events that are stored and automatically ranked and classified by digital platforms, before they are presented to the user as ‘memories’. This includes features such as Facebook Memories (Jacobsen and Beer Reference Jacobsen and Beer2021a), Apple's ‘Memories’ (Jacobsen Reference Jacobsen2022a), the memory function on Google Photos (Lee Reference Lee2020), and the newly launched ‘Advanced Stories’ feature on Facebook, which generates ‘stories’ – photos and videos that are visible on the user's profile for 24 h – based on previous posts (Hutchinson Reference Hutchinson2023). The sophistication of these apps differs, as Apple, Google, and Facebook's ‘Advanced Stories’ classify and rank photos according to themes – such as specific people, places, and activities – whereas Facebook's ‘Memories’ generate both photos and text, and centres on content published ‘around this date’ in previous years (Konrad Reference Konrad2017). They all subject content to artificial intelligence (AI) vision that allows recognition of people, places, objects, activity, and mood, as well as simpler technologies such as rule-based filters that exclude screenshots and unfocused photos as potential ‘memories’ (Shapira Reference Shapira2021). They also measure the engagement with algorithmically generated memories after they are presented to the user through shares, likes, and time spent engaging with the picture. Lee argues that these memories are not memories at all based on their cybernetic legacy: memory is reduced to a combination ‘of the data put in at the moment and of the records taken from past stored data’ (Lee Reference Lee2020, 6) and a ‘technical synthesis of storage and recollection’ as memory implies ‘the processing of the recorded information for future behaviors’ (Lee Reference Lee2020, 3). I, on the other hand, argue that they may well generate memories, but they are not memories made for you.

Initially, this article was motivated by a sense of intrusion that arises whenever algorithmically generated memories impose themselves on my present. In an article on users’ interactions with algorithmically generated memories, Jacobsen describes a common feeling of tension as users encounter these memories, a feeling marked by ‘an uncomfortable awareness of algorithms at work’ and ‘affective tensions of unpredictability’ (Jacobsen Reference Jacobsen2022b, 13). Although I am not alone in feeling unease, other users report feeling joy when interacting with algorithmically generated memories, especially when the feature allows them to customise the memories shown, thus providing a ‘sense of agency with regards to how memories are classified, ranked and targeted’ (Jacobsen and Beer Reference Jacobsen and Beer2021b, 82). My own discomfort may therefore result from algorithmic failure and the so-called ‘uncanny valley’: the disquiet from interacting with technologies that resemble humans but are not convincingly realistic. The technology, in this case an algorithm attempting to remember in a human way, reveals itself as technology, thus failing to produce the ‘jogging happy memories’, as promised by Facebook (Reid Reference Reid2019). But I believe there is more to my feeling of intrusion than algorithmic failure. I am intruded not only because the algorithm is prompting me to see specific parts of my past, but because the algorithm itself is seeing specific parts of my past: in telling me what to remember, the algorithm also sees me.

Paglen (Reference Paglen2016) delves into ‘the invisible visual culture’ of machine-images illegible to the human eye. There is a fundamental difference between analogously sharing a photo with your friends and sharing a photo on social media. A photo on Google, Apple, Facebook, Instagram, or Tiktok is immediately subject to machine vision dissecting it into data points that are legible to other machines, but not to humans. The machines, in this case a network of immensely powerful AI systems, reformulate content produced by us into machine-readable signals that are beyond our perceptual capacity. We encounter algorithmically generated memories through vision: I see a picture of a tree embracing a fence. But that picture has already been re-packaged as a digital one, classified and ranked according to a series of identifiers created through machine vision and categorisation of billions of pictures, before it is identified as a picture that will probably bring me joy. And as I am watching the picture, the duration of my gaze, whether I share it, or if I delete it, are data to be extracted. The algorithmic systems generating my memory are perceptive, or as formulated by Paglen (Reference Paglen2016): your pictures are looking at you.

Algorithmically generated memories are at the same time digital memories and targeted content, and transformative of both. When Instagram prompts me to buy a black t-shirt, it does so based on clicks, likes, purchases and searches that I've done in the past: my past behaviour is mobilised to influence my present choices. Aradau and Blanke (Reference Aradau and Blanke2022) argue that algorithmic reason undoes the distinction between speech and action, as data on my behaviour become the ‘truth’ about who I am. My speech and conscious expressions are not the narratives that define me. Rather, acts that can be datafied are what render my ‘truth’. Memories are central to how we perceive and understand the world, and how define and understand ourselves. When Google Photos prompts me to reminisce on cats I've met in Paris, it is an automated challenge to my auto-narration, as analysed by Jacobsen (Reference Jacobsen2022a), generated by perceptive technologies that shift the epistemologies of self-knowledge. According to Henri Bergson, memory always informs (conscious) perception, and in challenging my memories, the algorithmically generated memory also challenges my perception, such as the way I view Paris, or how I perceive the beauty if cats.

To capture their complexity, this article centres on three aspects of algorithmically generated memories: the spatialisation and calculation of time in algorithmic systems, algorithmic remembrance, and algorithmic perception. My point of departure is Bergson's philosophy of time, memory, and perception. Central to my argument is that algorithms cannot remember because they cannot live in duration, but they can perceive. Whereas duration – time itself – is a qualitative multiplicity characterised by indivisible change, the time of algorithms is spatial, quantitative, and reduces change to the divisible. Algorithmically generated memories rupture our duration as they impede on our attention to time as it passes, by invoking involuntary remembrance. They are not alone in evoking involuntary memory-work, but the scale and intimacy of their knowledge of our past, combined with the calculated rhythm of when pictures from our past are to be shown, make them different from other forms of involuntary memories. The generation of algorithmically generated memories depends on machine-learning technologies, computer systems with the capacity to learn from and adapt to their surroundings without explicit instructions, and I argue that this makes them perceptive. They do not perceive as conscious beings perceive, but in a manner that lies closer to what Bergson describes as ‘pure perception’: the aggregation of images in the present, uninformed by the past. Bergson argues that perception prepares the ‘body’ – the one that perceives – for action. It is therefore related to the perceiver's power to act. Consciousness and duration, on the other hand, relate to indecision: to retain time, hesitate, and to perceive the world without immediately acting on it.

Perception is to carve out static images of matter, it is always partial. What is perceived, which images are carved out, is motivated by the interests, and needs of the perceiver. When humans perceive, our memory pushes onto our present to inform our perception. As such, concrete perception – how we actually perceive – is somehow in the past. An algorithm cannot remember, it cannot actualise a virtual past to inform present perception, but only act on accumulated data that is materially stored in the present. Algorithmic perception is not a mere tool of human perception in the way that microscopes let us see bacteria and telescopes let us see the stars. Machine-learning algorithms, and AI technology in general, have a certain autonomy which is irreducible to the design by the original programmer, because they automate their own adaptation to an ever-changing world (Matzner Reference Matzner2019). Parisi (Reference Parisi2019) conceptualises this autonomy as an automation of automation, as the adaptive practice of machine-learning technologies allow them to generate new algorithmic rules. Hayles’ (Reference Hayles2016, Reference Hayles2017) recognises that not all cognition is conscious, and that both humans and some machines are capable of nonconscious cognition. Consciousness, according to Hayles, includes primary consciousness, an awareness of self, shared by humans, many mammals, and aquatic species such as octopi. Additionally, secondary consciousness, shared by humans and (perhaps) a few primates, is associated with ‘symbolic reasoning, abstract though, verbal language, mathematics, and so forth’ (Hayles Reference Hayles2017, 9). The autobiographical self is associated with higher consciousness, and is ‘reinforced through the verbal monologue that plays in our heads as we go about our daily business’ which is in turn ‘associated with the emergence of a self aware of itself as a self’ (Hayles Reference Hayles2017, 9). Cognition, however, which is shared by humans, animals, and some machines, involves a much faster processing of information than what consciousness is able of and the recognition of ‘patterns too complex and subtle for consciousness to discern, and drawing inferences that influence behavior and help to determine priorities’ (Hayles Reference Hayles2017, 10). Hayles argues that technologies such as AI, machine-learning algorithms and neural networks are nonconscious cognisers and can be transformative actors. Thus, what they do is irreducible to what a conscious mind intended for them to do (Hayles Reference Hayles2017). In Bergson, consciousness refers to the introduction of a delay – hesitation and indecision – between an impression received and the mobilisation of a body (Bergson Reference Bergson1946). As such, consciousness is related to the ability to not act, to hesitate: to receive an impression through perception, without immediately translating it into action. Additionally, consciousness involves the capacity to be affected by the force of time, and to feel emotions in the presence of memories, and it is a question of mind rather than the brain (Bergson Reference Bergson1946, Reference Bergson2004; Lazzarato Reference Lazzarato2007). Hayles and Bergson both agree that action does not depend on consciousness, but whereas Hayles emphasises the role of processing information in nonconscious cognition, a Bergsonian approach allows for a greater emphasis on the capacity to act beyond consciousness.

To argue that machine-learning algorithms are perceptive is not to argue that they are mere technological prolongations of human perception, or to argue that their perception is wholly autonomous from any human intent. But the interests and the capacity to act that inform algorithmic perception are irreducible to any human consciousness. The field of perception for an algorithmic system – the scale and granularity of big data – correlates with the power to act on that data, and both lie predominantly beyond human vision and conception. In the context of algorithmically generated memories, algorithmic perception implies that our memories are increasingly subjected to a perception that operates only in the present, and that the interests that inform algorithmic perception lie somewhat beyond interests or needs formulated by humans.

Almost two decades ago, Jose Van Dijck asked how digital technologies affect acts of memory. More pertinent to this article, she asked how digital technologies frame new ways of ‘retrieving mediated records of time past’ (Van Dijck Reference Van Dijck2005, 313).

There are obviously many ways to respond to both questions, as digital memory studies have shown, and any answer to these questions requires assumptions as to what a memory is. In Digital Timescapes, Robert Kitchin writes that ‘memories are remembered pasts – the recollection of and engagement with past events, experiences, thoughts, viewpoints and emotions’ that are triggered by specific encounters with surroundings, and it differs from storage of information because ‘memory relates to the qualities of the information recorded and how it is experienced when encountered’ (Kitchin Reference Kitchin2023, 58). Jacobsen and Beer refer to memories as something that ‘mediate those things that have been experienced’ (Jacobsen and Beer Reference Jacobsen and Beer2021b, 2). By referencing to Walter Benjamin's writings on memory, they describe memory as ‘an action’ of ‘digging’ for memory in one's past: in fact, ‘it is this very process that defines a particular past moment as a memory’ (Jacobsen and Beer Reference Jacobsen and Beer2021b, 2). If we take Benjamin's conceptualisation at face value, it would be difficult to argue that algorithmically generated memories are memories at all. It is the algorithm, the platform, which sorts and ranks ‘your past’ in these memories. Removing the ‘digging activity’ of a memory would therefore be a way of moving the past into the present through something else than a memory. However, as Kitchin notes above, a memory is also the engagement with the past: even if it is Google Photos that has ranked the picture of a cat from 2 years ago as worthy of remembrance, I am also engaging in that remembrance with my own personal memory-images of that cat, of that day, and of that street. Google Photos has hierarchised my past in a way that is extensively out of my control, but some of the memory-images of my past are still mine to behold.

Van Dijck's notion of mediated memories implies that we remember both in and through media technologies (Van Dijck Reference Van Dijck, Zwijnenberg and van de Vall2009). The mediation of memories happens in and through technologies that are produced and mediated by the ‘political economy of attention’ (Garde-Hansen and Schwartz Reference Garde-Hansen, Schwartz and Hoskins2017). This involves an acknowledgement of the social and shared nature of memories: that our recollection of and engagement with the past is never only a personal endeavour. The collective, or social aspect of memory has been recognised by memory studies long before the advent of digital media, amongst others by Maurice Halbwachs (Marcel Reference Marcel, Jaisson and Baudelot2007). Where Bergson's philosophy of memory is centred on the memory-images in a person's mind, and the way memory informs a person's perception in the now, his contemporaries like Halbwachs and Pierre Janet emphasised the social nature of remembering. Janet argued that the very definition of memory is social: memory is a narrative, or account [récit]; there is no memory if we do not have a narrative of a past to share with another – regardless of whether that narrative is actually shared or not (Janet Reference Janet2006). From a sociological point of view, the digital memory economy fuelled by digital media is therefore monetising an already social practice, which perpetuates already existing inequalities in social remembrance (Pogačar Reference Pogačar and Hoskins2017). In addition to being highly industrialised and complex, digital memory is a field of social production that is ‘both external and internal’: digital technologies record data from within our body through medical imaging, and they ‘capture and record data memories from far reaches of the universe and bring that knowledge to earth’ (Reading and Notley Reference Reading, Notley and Hoskins2017, 235). Memory, as an ‘egocentric yet deeply social’ activity (Hoskins Reference Hoskins2016, 348), is therefore reaching further in, and further out, through digital technologies. Algorithmically generated memories are one of the ways in which digital memory is reaching further in, and to capture this it is necessary to appreciate the intimate activity of remembering. The story we tell about a memory, the social negotiation of how the past should be actualised in the present, can never occur in a vacuous individual mind. However, the accumulated images from our body's perception of matter through time are of an individual nature; although the past is organic, flexible, and negotiable, it is moved into the present as a memory by a consciousness. And it is this very intimacy that algorithmically generated memories tap into. To capture that process it is appropriate to start with a theory of memory which supposes the mind as the mediator of memory.

In a broad sense, this paper is centred on the last of Van Dijck's questions mentioned above: how digital technologies frame new ways of retrieving mediated records of time past. Bergson has previously been mobilised to analyse transformations to memory instigated by digital media. Ernst (Reference Ernst and Hoskins2017) and Van Dijck (Reference Van Dijck, Zwijnenberg and van de Vall2009) both refer to Bergson to argue that memory always forms part of the present and the active nature of remembrance, as ‘the present dictates memories of the past: memory always has one foot in the present and another in the future’ (Van Dijck Reference Van Dijck, Zwijnenberg and van de Vall2009, 160–161). As I will discuss below, the present too always has one foot in the past. In his analysis of biobanks as an exteriorisation of memories of life, Clarizio (Reference Clarizio2022) uses Bergson to emphasise how memory pertains to life – that it is the living that remembers, and not the inorganic. However, memory can also be exteriorised through intelligence, and materialised as technology. In the context of biobanks this duality is actualised as memories of life, beyond the individual that is living, are materialised in technology. Amoore and Piotukh (Reference Amoore and Piotukh2015) refer specifically to Bergson's notion of perception as the authors analyse the way in which machine-learning algorithms perceive the world within which they move, to adapt to said world. They argue that algorithms are ‘organs of perception’ that quantify the world and see only parts of objects that are of immediate interest. Parikka (Reference Parikka and Hoskins2017) engages with Bergson's philosophy to a lesser extent, as he does not engage with Bergson directly, but references Maurizio Lazzarato's (Reference Lazzarato2007) in-depth analysis of Bergson's duration [la durée]Footnote 1, and the way in which time is what prevents everything from happening at once. Lazzarato analyses video and information technology as machines that crystallize time. He views videos as corresponding to Bergson's notion of perception in order to ‘pose the only reasonable question that can be addressed to these new technologies: to what degree of power [puissance], to what capacity to act, do they correspond?’ (Lazzarato Reference Lazzarato2007, 93, emphasis in original) Bergson views perception as directly linked to a capacity to act, and memory and time as inevitably linked to a capacity to feel. My analysis differs from Amoore and Piotukh's references to the machine-learning algorithm as an ‘organ of perception’ because I argue that machine-learning algorithms, as autonomously adapting to a changing environment, are perceivers, and not mere prolongations of human perceivers. Rather, I agree with Lazzarato's observations that machine perception – in his analysis a video machine – ‘has something of pure perception about it’ (Lazzarato Reference Lazzarato2007, 98) and Hayle's assertion that the speed of algorithmic cognition – in her analysis of High-Frequency Trading – introduces ‘a temporal gap between human and technical cognition that creates a realm of autonomy for technical agency’ (Hayles Reference Hayles2017, 142; see also Beer Reference Beer2017). Combined with the aforementioned scale of algorithmic perception, machine-learning algorithms should be conceptualised as perceivers, rather than mere organs of perception.

I had forgotten my friend pictured with me on a trampoline. We had never been close, and our estrangement had been undramatic. We had simply shared a shallow bond for a breath of time, which had disintegrated into nothingness without either of us paying too much attention. When Facebook nudges me to reminisce about this specific moment lost to the past, it is part of the ‘programmed sociability’ of social media (Bucher Reference Bucher2018). My former friend and I are still ‘friends’ on Facebook, and ‘friendship’ is at the heart of Facebook's business model. Of course, the Facebook version of ‘friend’ has little to do with what we otherwise think of as friendship, but is a category created to drive interaction, association, participation, and time spent on the platform (Bucher Reference Bucher2018). But there is more at stake here than a computational ambition to create friendships from collected sets of zeros and ones. There is also a tension arising from time being fractured. The past is too sharply cut off from the present as the I in the picture is not me, it is another, and the past shown is not my own. Before I habitually picked up my phone, the durational me was drinking my morning coffee in the present, whilst travelling between memories of the past, thoughts of the day, plans for the future and the fluid moment of the present: the process of caffeination here and now.

Bergson introduces the concept of duration in his doctoral thesis, the English title of which is Time and Free Will, an essay on the immediate data of consciousness in 1889. Duration is not the quantitative time measured by clocks, but a ‘heterogenous multiplicity’: flowing, fluid, and rhythmic, and accessible through intuition. Duration cannot be measured in seconds and minutes, where each moment is gone as the next one arrives. The length of a moment is fluid, and it is a question of attentiveness to a period of duration. Duration concerns ‘the happening of time as it passes’ (Guerlac Reference Guerlac, Sinclair and Wolf2021, 45, emphasis in original). To describe duration, Bergson often turns to the image of music, to rhythm, to capture the qualitative nature of time as opposed to the quantitative nature of space. When we listen to a piece of music, we do not listen to each individual note, but we ‘perceive them in one another’, so that ‘if we interrupt the rhythm by dwelling longer than is right on one note of the tune, it is not the exaggerated length, which will warn us of our mistake, but the qualitative change thereby caused in the whole of the musical phrase’ (Bergson Reference Bergson2001, 101). Duration ‘knits past, present, and future together’ as the musical phrase ‘both flows through time and holds time, bonding the first notes … to the last in an unusual structure in which unity and multiplicity overlap’ (Guerlac Reference Guerlac, Sinclair and Wolf2021, 47). In a lecture on the soul and the body, given in Paris in April 1912, Bergson writes that ‘our whole psychical existence is something just like this single sentence, continued since the first awakening of consciousness, interspersed with commas, but never broken by full stops. And consequently I believe that our whole past still exists’ (Bergson Reference Bergson1920). Duration – the happening of time as it passes – is therefore a question of attention in a literal sense, as the division between present and past is relative to ‘the extent of the field which our attention to life can embrace. The ‘present’ occupies exactly as much space as this effort’ (Bergson Reference Bergson1946, 127). Just as history becomes history when it does not have any ‘direct interest to the politics of the day and can be neglected without the affairs of the country being affected by it’ (Bergson Reference Bergson1946, 127), our present becomes our past when our immediate attention to duration is broken.

The past doesn't cease to exist as a new present arrives but goes on to exist in a virtual state. Whereas the present is actual [actuelle]Footnote 2 and real, the past is virtual. Bergson refers to the virtual past of everything that has ever been as ‘pure memory’ [mémoire pure] which we may actualise in the present through remembrance. Our attention to life is conditioned by memories, but if incohesive, memories impede our attentiveness to the present, and the past demands privilege over the actual life of now. To be attentive to the present is not about forgetting one's former states, ‘it is enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state … but forms the past and the present states into an organic whole’ (Bergson Reference Bergson2001, 100). Pure duration, to exist fully in time, is the form assumed by ‘our conscious states … when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states’ (Bergson Reference Bergson2001, 100, emphasis in original). As illustrated by Sinclair (Reference Sinclair2020), we do not understand a work of music by recollecting the previous note as the current one is being played. Rather, we experience the whole melody as one continuous flow of time which is not delegated to the past until the rhythm has stopped. To act as our whole being, as our whole duration as one, is for Bergson the highest degree of freedom.

But memories are often incohesive and rupture our attention to life – this is not unique to algorithmically generated memories. Any part of our surroundings has the potential to trigger a memory disrupting our morning routine and Bergson acknowledges that many memories are involuntary, and that always being attentive to life is unattainable. I may detach myself from my present and rupture my attentiveness to duration, if I smelled the perfume of someone missed, or heard a tune I had forgotten that exists. And had the former friend jumping on the trampoline been someone dear to me, I may even have reminisced in gratifying nostalgia, as many social media users do. But somehow, targeted content generated by digitally stored personal data and information seems qualitatively different from familiar perfume worn casually by a stranger. One obvious reason for that is that the pictures generated by these media are directed towards me. A stranger wearing a certain perfume is not doing so to evoke specific memory-work in me – to deliberately rupture my attentiveness to duration would require them to possess detailed knowledge of my past and to mobilise this knowledge would be rather manipulative. An algorithmically generated memory has a purpose. Its aim is to give me a pleasant feeling and make me spend more time on the platform; my memory-work is manipulated in a quest for revenue (Reid Reference Reid2019). But to be targeted by algorithmically generated content is not unique to algorithmically generated memories. The very temporality of social media, the rhetoric of how the world is formulated on the interface I behold is already composed for my eyes, or more specifically an assumption of who the one who sees is (Bucher Reference Bucher2020; Jacobsen Reference Jacobsen2022b). And this assumed I – the data double composed by all traces I have left online coupled with assumptions on what someone ‘like me’ ‘is like’ (Lury and Day Reference Lury and Day2019) – has its own ‘rhythm’ (Carmi Reference Carmi2020) which operates in tandem with my own duration and my own becoming. But my data double does not become – it is not a conscious being and it feels nothing at all in its encounter with an algorithmically generated memory – it has no attentiveness to time as it passes that can be ruptured: it is an emotionless, spatialised shadow of my conscious being, whose development is targeted, in an attempt to target me, by algorithmically generated memories.

It is the ‘universal becoming’ and the assertion that ‘reality is becoming’ (Bergson Reference Bergson1946, 131) that came to form part of the metaphysical background for cybernetics. Halpern argues that Wiener (Reference Wiener1948) chose to refer to Bergson specifically in Cybernetics because Bergson's attempt to ‘produce forms of thought that did not remain static and always combined the memory of an event with its future’ (Halpern Reference Halpern2014, 52) gave Wiener the ‘tools for creating systems that were self-referential and in which the temporal frames of recording the past and producing the future became compressed’ (Halpern Reference Halpern2014, 53). The cybernetic, and computational, view on machine memory as the storage and categorisation of information to inform future action is similar to Bergson's insistence on the past never ceasing to exist, but pushing onto our present which is always directed towards the future. However, cybernetic, computational, and algorithmic time is always a spatial one, as pointed out by Amoore and Piotukh (Reference Amoore and Piotukh2015). AI, for instance, cuts up time in ‘time slices’, during which variables can be ‘measured’ as the world is viewed as a series of snapshots (Russell et al. Reference Russell, Norvig and Davis2010, 567). Although the length of the time slices varies, they always serve to cut up continuous change, such as the slice of time I let a picture of a cat cover the screen of my phone, during which my actual gaze moves from the picture's background, to cat, and to inwards reflection as I conjure my own memory-images. In algorithmic reason, becoming is always divisible, dividing up change, and algorithmically generated memories are generated in time slices, crystallising time (Lazzarato Reference Lazzarato2007).

It is afternoon and I am trying to recall what I need to get from the supermarket. Google Photos notifies me with a composed selection of images taken at twilight titled ‘The golden hour’. One of the photos is taken as I am eating apples next to a bonfire. Next to me is my partner at the time trying to devour a melted marshmallow without compromising their elegant disposition. I notice a former colleague I had never liked; I had forgotten they had been there. It is cloudy, although I had always imagined the evening sky to be clear. The shopping list I had been drawing up in my mind only minutes earlier has disappeared, as I feel sadness in hearing laughter long gone and a bonfire that stopped burning almost a decade ago.

As I have already discussed, the past represented in this photograph is not gone but goes on to exist in a virtual state. It is this virtual state that Bergson refers to as ‘pure memory’, but it is perhaps more accurately described as ‘pure past’ (Sinclair Reference Sinclair2020). Pure memory is not a conservationist argument claiming that memory is merely the accumulation of all that has happened. Rather, it is a metaphysical argument as to the ‘pastness’ of a memory-image. When all that is real and actual is the present, a memory-image too is in the present, just as any imagination with no relationship to something that has happened is in the present. To distinguish a memory-image from an imagination, something about the memory must give it its ‘pastness’, which cannot be anything found in the present such as a data centre, diary, or the brain. As such, it is hard to capture by language as we cannot ask where it goes, because the framework of space is misplaced: it is virtual and not material, it does not go any‘where’. But data on my behaviour, on the time and place the photo was taken, are all material and stored ‘somewhere’ in the cloud, in the present. The data stored in big data is therefore only a specific form of knowledge of the past, limited to knowing only the past that can be datafied.

Bergson describes the activity of remembering as how the past survives in the present (Bergson Reference Bergson2004). He argues that although we remember more than we seem to think, we cannot capture pure memory in its totality. Rather, the parts of pure memory that survive in the present depend on the present whence it is conjured. It is an activity of the present which allows the past to take actual form but the form it takes will never be ‘accurate’, it will never be a complete reproduction of the past in all its complexity. Pure memory, for Bergson, is not the storage of everything that passes, which can then be replayed at will. Rather, pure memory is the predicament of remembrance: ‘there can be no pure act of remembering’ (Sinclair Reference Sinclair2020, 100, emphasis in original).

The complexity of our memory-images depends on our interests in the present situation we remember in. When memories are mobilised to inform action, they are reduced in detail, and we recollect only what is useful for our actions in the present. When I am composing my shopping list, I am recalling my empty fridge to readily inform my action in the present, which is to write down which foods I am lacking. I am reducing the complexity of the image I have of my kitchen; of the dishes that should have been washed, and the boredom of my morning routine. When we move towards pure memory, memory-images retain more fully their details, as ‘we detach ourselves from our sensory and motor state to live in the life of dreams’ (Bergson Reference Bergson2004, 211). A memory is therefore necessarily organic and flexible as what past survives in the present depends on the presence whence it is visited. This processual notion of memory, that it is a process of moving the past into the present, forms the basis of the cybernetic imagination of memory, as memory becomes a ‘temporal matter of processing the archive, instead of the spatial matter of recording data in storage’ (Lee Reference Lee2020, 5). As argued by Lee, the composition of photos presented by Google is an example of how ‘computer-memory is no longer read-only storage, but the successively generated archive … even though what appears on the screen seems permanent, link locations of information always change in every regeneration of the information’ (Lee Reference Lee2020, 5). There are, however, nuances to that claim. Coeckelbergh (Reference Coeckelbergh2021) points out that the very data points that are stored do not change in real-time as soon as they enter the data set: we can change the algorithm, but the data on the past is stored in data points, spatialised in an eternal present. But these data points are illegible to us, or to use Paglen's (Reference Paglen2016) formulation – they are invisible to us – and the only way in which we can see them is through algorithms that evolve through time, showing us bits of our past when it is considered the ‘right-time’ (Bucher Reference Bucher2020; Jacobsen Reference Jacobsen2022b) to do so.

Bergson is not always clear on how pure memory – the past – comes to be actualised in human remembrance. On one hand, memories push onto the present; they inform perception even when I am not conjuring them. As such, perception is already memory, because in practice ‘we perceive only the past, the pure present being only the ungraspable progress of the past gnawing into the future’ (Bergson Reference Bergson2004, 194). But on the other hand, he describes the past as impotent, until ‘consciousness … follows memory at work’ (Bergson Reference Bergson2004, 171). Whereas the first formulation describes how perception is never without memory, as ‘it is impregnated with memory-images which complete it as they interpret it’ (Bergson Reference Bergson2004, 170), the latter accounts for the voluntary memory-work of letting parts of pure memory become actualised in the present. Sinclair argues that the notion of pure memory both pushing onto the present, and impotent until activated by memory-work lets us ‘understand involuntary memory as a function of memories that come back to us without us having sought them’ (Sinclair Reference Sinclair2020, 105).

The series of photographs taken at twilight, composed by Google Photos as a category of the past to be remembered, invoke involuntary memories in me. They rupture duration as I am not taking a voluntary leap into the dreamlike state of nostalgia, which ‘I may lengthen and shorten at will; I assign to it any duration that I please’ (Bergson Reference Bergson2004, 91). The fluid present of my morning coffee is ruptured by spatialised knowledge on my past, as I involuntarily actualise memories of a past deemed valuable by algorithmic systems owned by Google Inc. However, as I engage with the algorithmically generated memory, I am re-negotiating my memory-images, as their meteorological canvas and social composition are called into question. As such, my interaction with the algorithmically generated memory is at both times involuntary and voluntary. My memory-images are triggered without me having sought them, but I consciously engage with them as they emerge in ‘an interactive and iterative process of interpretation and reinterpretation of an ‘imagined reconstruction’ of the past and [my] relationship to that past’ (Jacobsen and Beer Reference Jacobsen and Beer2021b, 64).

As described by Lazzarato, duration is force, ‘and it acts like one because it produces the capacity to ‘feel’, to be affected’ (Lazzarato Reference Lazzarato2007, 95). A memory-image both informs my actions in the present – it implies a capacity to act – and it evokes emotions in me, it leaves me affected. An algorithm cannot remember, and duration lies beyond its grasp because it can act only in spatialised time. But it can act on my duration; it has capacity to make me feel, to be affected. And it can do so because it perceives without memory. And it can do so effectively, because its power to act is proportional to its perceptual horizon, and not its will or consciousness.

Despite never having labelled any of the photos stored in the Google cloud, Google photo has managed to identify and categorise photos taken during ‘the golden hour’ and anticipate that seeing these photos would affect me, and hopefully bring me joy. Such a categorisation depends on the Google algorithm being able to distinguish sunlight from artificial lightening, just as it can distinguish cats from dogs, and smiles from frowns. The automatic generation of albums implies that ‘the algorithms can identify not only information about photos but also information in photos’ (Lee Reference Lee2020, 8, emphasis in original). Algorithmic perception is not entirely autonomous from human needs and interests. The categories are usually created by human beings, and the algorithm has been trained, usually with some supervision involved, on training sets consisting of photos taken by human beings. But subsequent perception happens without supervision, and what an algorithm can perceive is often beyond our sight. This is both because of the sheer scale of what is perceived, and because their perception follows a logic that seems alien to the human eye. Paglen (Reference Paglen2016) writes that Facebook's DeepFace algorithm, which was first deployed almost 10 years ago to identify faces, can achieve 97% accuracy at identifying individuals. That percentage is comparable to what a human can achieve, but ‘no human can recall the faces of billions of people’ (Paglen Reference Paglen2016). The Eigenface technology, used in surveillance technologies, identifies the uniqueness of faces by subtracting all common features from a face, thus creating facial ‘fingerprints’ (Acar Reference Acar2018; Paglen Reference Paglen2016). Machine vision is developed to transcend human vision through its own set of perceptual rules, which are continuously being updated through the expansion of available training sets.

The present, according to Bergson, the extended period of duration we refer as ‘now’, is actual and real. Although concrete perception is always informed by memory which pushes onto our present, pure perception is not virtual, but spatial. When we perceive an object, we perceive an aggregate of images. The word ‘image’ does not denote anything more mysterious than the impressions made on my sensory organs by my morning coffee. In arguing that matter is an aggregate of images, Bergson sought to undo the dualism of materialism and idealism: our perception of our surroundings is not independent of the objects we perceive, but it is limited and can never capture the totality of what we have in front of us (Bergson Reference Bergson2004). Our body too is an image, just as the external world is an aggregate of images. But our proper body is privileged compared to the others, because perception is informed by what the body that perceives finds useful; what is of interest to the body, and it does so to prime the body for action. I have already argued that machine-learning algorithms cannot be reduced to their original design: their automatic adaptation as they voyage through the actual world has a degree of independence from their original design. The perceptive machine-learning algorithm is therefore more than an ‘organ of perception’, as argued by Amoore and Piotukh (Reference Amoore and Piotukh2015), but lies closer to a ‘body that perceives’, a perceiver.

Perception is subjective and extracts from a given situation ‘that in it which is useful, and [stores] up the eventual reaction in the form of a motor habit, that may serve other situations of the same kind’ (Bergson Reference Bergson2004, 218), and it is this lag between perception and bodily action which is created by consciousness. In conscious perception, it is through the moment of hesitation and indecision that ‘the impression received, instead of expanding into more movements, spiritualises itself into consciousness’ (Bergson Reference Bergson2004, 100). In a certain way, Bergson's perception recasts how we commonly approach questions on agency and consciousness. In Bergson, consciousness is not directly related to action, but to the moment of hesitation which allows us to choose how to act. Consciousness is to be found in a time lag: in indecision, in inaction, the ability to receive an impression through perception without immediately acting on it. Pure perception is the perception of the world without duration, it is the perception of the world of only images, without any rhythm of duration, but human perception is never pure, but concrete. When conscious beings perceive, pure perception is always coupled with memory, which allows concrete perception to perceive images in one another, fitting them into rhythms and continuous change (Bergson Reference Bergson1946, Reference Bergson2004), but in pure perception, duration is abolished and ‘the result will be an infinitely more divided, diluted duration’ (Lazzarato Reference Lazzarato2007, 94).

The records of the past stored in the cloud were once records of the present: all pasts have at some point been present. When these records are perceived, they too are perceived in the present and do not let the past survive in the present. Rather, they reduce the past to actual and real data points that can be perceived in the present; they deny the past its virtuality. Lazzarato writes that ‘technologies simulate corporeal perception in that they operate on the single plane of the present, like a mechanism that receives and returns movements’ (Lazzarato Reference Lazzarato2007, 110). But duration ‘is what hinders everything from being given at once. It retards, or rather it is retardation’ (Bergson Reference Bergson1946, 75). The speed between perception and movement is also central to Wiener's moral and technical reflections on automatic cognition, as he writes that machines ‘can and do transcend some of the limitations of their designers, and that in doing so they may be both effective and dangerous’ (Wiener Reference Wiener1960, 1355). A danger he identified was the speed at which machines can perform tasks, which means that human criticism of their performance risks always being too late (Wiener Reference Wiener1960). As mentioned above, Hayles (Reference Hayles2016) too argues that the speed of machine cognition creates a time gap for machine agency. Duration, and consciousness, introduces a delay between impressions received and bodily reaction, which in turn retards power to act on the world. The power of algorithmic technologies lays in their lack of consciousness, in their abolishment of hesitation between perception and action. But as unconscious, a machine-learning algorithm's adaptation to its surroundings is purely automatic. The direct translation of impressions received into bodily action is deterministic and devoid of choice. What makes the machine-learning algorithm change in ways that may seem unpredictable, is not the unpredictability of its reactions to input, but the unpredictability of what it perceives. It feeds off human hesitation, and as such also human consciousness. Its power to act lies in its lack of choice, and its power to adapt lies in our indecision.

The present within which algorithms perceive is an extended one, as it is composed by data of an immense scale and granularity. Aradau and Blanke argue that algorithmic reason ‘promises to transcend the methodological and ontological distinctions between small and large, minuscule and massive, part and whole’ (Aradau and Blanke Reference Aradau and Blanke2022, 23). When we perceive something distant, its capacity to act on us is virtual, and so is our capacity to act on it. But as the distance between us and what we perceive decreases, the ‘more virtual action tends to be transformed into real action’ (Lazzarato Reference Lazzarato2007, 100). In undoing the distinctions between small and large, algorithmic reason also seeks so undo the distinction between distant and near: the immediate presence is ever more expansive. In the context of algorithmically generated memories, that means that knowledge of an event of my past lies close to the real and actual actions of immensely powerful AI systems, whilst distant and invisible to any conscious being trying to perceive the same data. This is not exclusively bad. It is presumptuous to assume that all that is forgotten should be forgotten, and there may be things in pure memory that I can only actualise through the help of algorithmically generated memories. But it does mean that my past does not primarily exist in a virtual state, that I access and leave at my own will, or that potently informs my present through my perception. It means that knowledge of my past persists in a spatialised and actual form, which is no more accessible to me than my pure memory, but whose legibility is extensively determined by algorithmic perception. In a way, we can never perceive our past, but an algorithm can.

Perception is a determination of the possible: we see what we can act on. That algorithmic perception is motivated by more than human interests, also means that the actions that can be acted on are formulated by more than human capacities. When Facebook nudges me to remember a former friend, it is doing so because my former friend is on Facebook: we are Facebook friends, and our reconciliation is actionable on Facebook. In perceiving my past, algorithms are also appropriating the delineation of what can be acted on, in my life. Facebook was able to perceive that my former friend and I had previously spent time together through organic content published on the platform. Facebook could also perceive that the former friend and I had not been a couple that broke up, and that neither of us was dead, because in both those cases it could be unpleasant for me to be reminded of my memories of them. The person on the trampoline is not the only former friend I could have reminisced on and potentially re-establish contact with. But if they are not on Facebook, in a photo, with me, and Facebook friends with me, that is not perceivable to a Facebook algorithm, because it is not actionable to Facebook. That may not significantly influence my life: I am still free to reminisce in my own memory-images, searching for friends I have lost contact with and choose whether I want to reach out to them or not. But no matter what I choose, the algorithm will feed off that choice, adapting its future behaviour based on whether I ignore the picture, share it, or delete it. I can also ignore the compilation of ‘The golden hour’ that Google has composed for me, or I can quickly skip from one picture to the next, delete some of them, delete all of it, or share the whole album with my friends. The choice is mine, but the delineation of available choices is created by Google, and it is generated in front of me faster than anything similar I could have achieved myself. And no matter what I choose, it will feed off that choice, adapt to it, and therefore encompass it in an ever-expanding present beyond my perception.

I have the freedom to turn off the notifications on my phone, and to limit the amount of photos I take and the photos I share. I may also choose to ignore algorithmically generated memories and spend my days reminiscing in my own memory-images, free from buzzing notifications. But neither of those choices would stop the transformation of memory-practices brought on by digital media, and algorithmically generated memories plays an important part in contemporary memory-practices. On social media, algorithmically generated memories are a way to salvage platforms from decreases in organic content published by their users (King Reference King2023), and for users they are a convenient way to generate attention without having to create new content (Hutchinson Reference Hutchinson2023; Worb Reference Worb2022). In this article, I have untangled the power that pertains to algorithmically generated memories and argued that machine-learning algorithms should be understood as perceptive. When perception immediately leads to action, those actions are ‘determinate movements’, according to Bergson (Bergson Reference Bergson2004, 219). But in dreaming, which is the opposite to what I have described as nonconscious perception, perception ‘melts into an infinity of memories, all equally possible’ (Bergson Reference Bergson2004, 219). The lack of hesitation between perception and action which demarks the power of algorithmic perception, is also what delimits the possible in algorithmic reason. Because it is their nonconscious perception which allows them to perceive widely and act quickly. And it is their lack of hesitation which limits their – and subsequently some of our – imagination of what is possible.

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